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Abstract 
 
 
 
Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, Journal of Financial Economics) explores the role of 
alternative financing channels (e.g., trade credits and private credit agencies) and 
governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationship, in 
explaining the growth of the private sector in China.  We complement their study by 
examining how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find 
that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which 
implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market and are 
behaving more like their western counterparts. On top of this, however, we find that 
having a state minority ownership helps firms obtain bank loans, which suggest that 
political connections still play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we 
find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for 
manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed 
banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large 
firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.   
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Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in China’s Private Sector 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s transition from a centrally planned socialist economy to a vibrant and fast 
expanding commercially oriented economy is well-documented (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; 
Lardy, 1998). This transformation involves moves toward the adoption of free-market 
policies, improvements in the commercial banking system, developing modern financial 
markets, and the writing and enforcement of commercial laws. At the corporate level, the 
reorganization of wholly owned state enterprises into listed joint stock companies with 
minority private ownership has led to some improvement in efficiency (Chen, Firth, Xin and 
Xu, 2008). However, the biggest spark for economic growth has been the emergence of 
privately owned non-listed firms. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the private 
sector accounted for roughly 50% of GNP in 2005 and this is expected to rise to at least 75% 
by 2010
1
. 
One interesting, and as yet unresolved, question is the role that the banking sector has 
played in helping finance the expansion of private firms. The focus of our study, therefore, is 
to shed some light on this issue and, in particular, to gain an understanding of how banks 
make lending decisions to non-listed private businesses. Our interest in this issue is piqued by 
the seemingly mixed messages from prior research. 
International evidence provides some background on the conditions that are deemed 
necessary for economies to flourish. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
1999，2000，2002a), in a series of studies, argue that the rule of law (including law 
enforcement), private ownership, and corporate governance are crucial elements in explaining 
economic success and corporate value. Other studies have stressed the need for highly 
developed capital markets and financial intermediaries to help foster a successful corporate 
sector (King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Kroszner, Laeven and Klingerbiel, 
2007). Using this “law-finance-growth” research (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) as 
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a backdrop, Allen et al. (2005) conclude that China does not display the conditions necessary 
for a vibrant private sector. For example, it is argued that despite some recent improvements, 
China still has an underdeveloped and capricious legal system, weak investor protection, a 
chronic lack of law enforcement, rampant cronyism, and overarching government 
interference and control. This suggests that China’s private sector should be subdued at best 
and completely irrelevant at worst, but this clearly flies in the face of the available evidence
2
. 
Allen et al. (2005) seek to explain the paradox by arguing that private firms make use of 
informal financing channels such as trade credits and private credit agencies that rely on 
alternative governance mechanisms such as family connections and the personal reputation of 
the entrepreneurs. By implication, banks do not play an active role in financing private firms 
in China. However, international evidence has shown that the support of formal financing to 
private firms determines the sustainability of this sector (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006) 
and informal financing based on relationships is detrimental to business exchange, 
competition and innovation (Biggs and Shah, 2006). Thus, the importance of informal 
finance, especially in the longer-term, is a controversial topic and one that deserves additional 
investigation. In this study, we focus on the formal financing and governance mechanisms of 
non-listed private Chinese firms using survey data from the World Bank. 
There are numerous criticisms of China’s banking system including factors that 
inhibit it from providing finance to the private sector. These include the stylized facts that the 
banks are state-controlled (almost 100% owned by the government during the period of our 
study)
3
, carry out policy lending that follows government directives rather than commercial 
considerations, and discriminate against private firms (Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 
2003). As support for the latter stylized fact, bank statistics show that although the private 
sector accounts for 50 percent of the economy it accounts for just 7 percent of bank lending. 
In light of these and other criticisms, the Chinese government has introduced a series of 
reforms in the banking sector to promote the availability of bank loans to private firms. 
                                                 
2
 In this sense, China has been regarded as a significant counter-example to the findings of the existing literature 
on law, institutions, finance and growth (Allen et al., 2005).  
3
 According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002b), the government owns 99.45% of the ten largest 
banks in China. 
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However, systematic evidence on how bank loans are allocated to private firms in China 
remains scarce. Based on a World Bank nation-wide survey, this paper attempts to look 
inside the black box of bank lending decisions and answer the following questions about the 
determinants of bank financing to the private sector. Do the banks allocate loans to private 
firms according to a firm’s financial performance?  Do political connections still matter in the 
allocation of loans to the private sector? Does managerial experience and corporate 
governance facilitate private firms’ access to bank loans? Do the determinants of lending 
decisions vary with industries, firm size and level of market development?    
We find that banks tend to allocate loans to private non-listed firms with higher 
profitability, more experienced and incentive-compatible CEOs, and more independent 
corporate boards. The results suggest that the banks are extending loans to financially 
healthier firms and better governed firms. As a complement to the conclusions in Allen et al. 
(2005) regarding the importance of informal channels of finance, we present evidence that the 
banking sector uses commercial judgments in lending decisions. However, we find that state 
ownership and business connections with the government still help firms gain access to bank 
finance.  Thus, political connections do carry weight in the lending decisions to the private 
sector. Further analyses reveal that the determinants of the lending decisions vary across 
industries, firm size and levels of institutional development. Specifically, commercial 
judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large 
firms, and firms located in regions with a more liberalized banking sector. Political 
connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in 
areas with a less liberalized banking sector.  Our results indicate that, after 30 years of reform, 
China’s banking sector has started to behave more like commercially viable corporate banks. 
We find that the influences of political connections still persist, although the weaker role of 
political connections in regions with a more liberalized banking sector suggests that the banks 
are becoming more and more market-oriented as the reforms take effect. Our findings add to 
the recent literature on the structure, performance and functioning of China’s banking sector 
(e.g. Berger, Hasan and Zou, 2009; Ferri, 2009; Fu and Heffernan, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 
2009; Wu and Yue, 2009; Jia, 2009). 
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the research background. 
Section 3 describes the data and the empirical models.  The empirical results and their 
interpretations are reported in section 4.  Section 5 concludes.   
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 The development of the Chinese private sector 
One of the most far-reaching changes in China’s economy brought about by the 
economic reforms is the gradual shift away from complete reliance on state-owned and 
collective enterprises to a mixed economy where private enterprises play a major role in 
promoting growth, innovation, and employment. The private sector, which consists of mainly 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs hereafter), is considered rightly as the major 
engine of China’s rapid growth.  
Public ownership is regarded as a defining feature of socialism. The rise of China’s 
private sector reflects the government’s compromise between ideological correctness and 
economic pragmatism. The 15
th
 Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 
1997 lifted many legal and economic barriers to private sector growth, including giving 
official approval to bank lending to private business.  Nevertheless, towards the end of the 
1990s, private ownership was still considered an inferior ownership arrangement and thus 
operated under an adverse political and legal environment.  
Since the late 1990s, there has been a dramatic change in sentiment towards private 
capital. This follows the Communist party’s belated acknowledgement of the informal private 
sector’s importance and relevance to the national economy (Tsai, 2007). Moreover, recent 
government personnel reform and fiscal reform also provide a more supportive business 
environment for the private sector (Allen et al., 2005). In 2004, the National Congress 
approved a constitutional amendment to protect private property rights, granting “private 
property” an equal legal status to “public property”. Despite the constitutional changes and 
official encouragement of the private sector, some commentators continue to believe that the 
government’s ownership of formal external financing sources inevitably leads to a biased 
capital allocation policy that discriminates against private businesses (Brandt and Li, 2003; 
Ge and Qiu, 2007).  
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The economic reforms have reduced significantly the size of the state sector in the 
economy, with non-state enterprises’ production to total production increasing from 50.37% 
in 1998 to 66.72% in 2005. The proportion of total employment provided by private firms 
increased from 58.1% to 76.26% in the same period (see Table 1). Table 1 presents official 
statistics that show the rapid growth of the economy and the even faster growth of the private 
sector. The decline of the state sector in China is supposed to emancipate the banking sector 
from the obligation to provide policy loans to the ailing state-owned enterprises.
4
 As we shall 
discuss shortly, a series of reforms have been introduced with the objective of transforming 
China’s banking sector from a conduit of government policies into a fully commercialized 
modern financial intermediary that channels funds to the most efficient economic units 
regardless of their ownership identity (Podpiera, 2006). As a result, and local political 
influence notwithstanding, the reforms have led to significant changes in the lending 
behaviors of the commercial banks in China (Park and Shen, 2003). Next, we briefly review 
China’s banking sector reforms in order to justify the variable selection of our model and to 
provide further institutional background for our study. 
[Table 1 Here] 
2.2 The evolving status of the Chinese banking sector 
A salient characteristic of China’s banking sector is the dominant state ownership of 
banks, which allows government involvement in the decision making of those banks.
5
  Before 
the late 1990s, the Chinese banking sector had little latitude but to serve as a conduit for 
channeling low-cost capital to SOEs because SOEs were assumed the task of employment 
and social welfare provision. The private sector was virtually excluded from the formal credit 
market. As a result, policy lending remained a defining characteristic of the Chinese banking 
system
6
. Serving as policy lending tools, the state-owned banks were able to ignore the non-
                                                 
4
 Of course, the problem of non performing loans continues to exist although there are plans to hive these off to 
specialist agencies.  
5
 Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005), and La Porta et al. (2002b) also discuss problems associated with state 
ownership of banks and how these problems distort commercial lending decisions. Our study extends this strand 
of literature by providing evidence from China. 
6
 According to Lardy (1998), even when narrowly defining policy lending as loans for specific projects 
identified by State Planning Commission, one-third of total loans outstanding were policy loans in 1985, while it 
was one fifth in 1995. If loans for other projects and for bailouts are included in the definition, then policy 
lending was much higher. 
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performing loans and bank profitability on the grounds that they were caused by their state-
assigned credit obligations and therefore it was up to the central government to bear the final 
responsibility. Accordingly, the banks in China had neither the incentives nor the ability to 
screen borrowers and ensure loan repayment.  
As a consequence of this policy lending, banks in China have been saddled with 
extensive portfolios of non-performing loans (NPLs). According to Dai Xianglong, governor 
of the People’s Bank of China (the defacto central bank), NPLs as a share of state banks’ total 
loans was 20% in 1994. The ratio increased to 25% in 1997 and then 35% in 2000 (Tung, 
2002).  However, these estimates are based on a loan classification system that is more 
lenient than the systems adopted in most modern capitalist banking systems. The estimates of 
western observers generally put the NPL ratio as high as 40 to 50 per cent of loans 
outstanding.
7
  
The declining asset quality of state-owned banks imposed a heavy tax burden as the 
government was forced to inject public funds to clean up the banks’ balance sheets. This 
injection of public funds has been very visible in the last few years as banks have sought to 
shore up their balance sheets prior to listing on foreign as well as domestic stock markets. 
What is more, China’s government is very concerned about the competitiveness of domestic 
banks, as the country has begun to open the banking sector to foreign competitors since the 
end of 2006, as mandated by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In light of the problems 
and the international competition they face, the state owned banks have introduced reforms 
on five fronts: devolving the policy lending task to three policy banks, transferring NPLs to 
newly established asset management companies, internal management reforms, introducing 
strategic investors, and public listing
8
, all of which are aimed at transforming the banks from 
a policy tool into a business entity operating on a commercial basis. The ongoing 
commercialization process of China’s banking sector affects the behavior of bank executives. 
Recently introduced incentive and discipline mechanisms precipitated improved credit 
                                                 
7
 Lardy (1998, pp. 115-124). 
8
 Note, at the time of the survey (2003), all banks were fully owned by the state. 
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analysis and risk evaluation by China’s banks.9 Moreover, local governments no longer have 
direct authority over local branches of banks. The performance of local bank staff is 
evaluated by branches higher up in the hierarchy of the bank, thereby limiting local political 
influence on bank decisions.  
Faced with the increasing importance of the private sector in employment creation 
and economic growth, the government in 1997, for the first time, formally allowed banks to 
extend loans to the private sector. Recently, the government has also introduced a series of 
measures to promote the availability of bank loans to SMEs. Banks were urged to base their 
lending decisions not on the size and ownership structure of the borrowers, but on the default 
risks and business prospects of the eligible borrowers.
10
  
Asymmetric information problems are particularly pervasive in the lender-borrower 
relationship in China. After serving as a key government policy tool for decades, the banks 
simply do not have the credit history records to back up their loan allocation decisions (Wong 
and Wong, 2001)
11
. The information problems are particularly severe when lending to the 
private sector because the private firms are new customers to the banks (which had 
previously lent only to SOEs). With a short bank-borrower relationship, the banks are not 
able to accumulate sufficient soft qualitative information on private firms (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Stein, 2002). Most private firms in China are SMEs and less is known about them 
because of their informal accounting, internal control and governance systems (Berger and 
Udell, 2006).  
It is crucial that Chinese banks find signals or indicators to infer the quality of the 
potential borrowers. Based on the extant literature, financial performance, political 
connection, and corporate governance have the potential to serve as credible signals (e.g., 
Mitton, 2002; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Identification of the signals used by 
                                                 
9
 The growing importance of performance-based payments in banking staffs’ compensation packages results in 
more weight being attached to bank profitability.  In July 2004, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) promulgated the Guidelines on Commercial Banks’ Due Diligence Performance in Credit Business, 
which requires each bank to define clearly the responsibilities and due diligence assessment criteria for every 
function involved in the lending process. In a more general setting, Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) show that listed 
firms in China are using performance as a factor in setting the compensation of senior executives. 
10
 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=1250 
11
 Such information sharing is very helpful to banks when making lending decisions on SMEs (Pagano and 
Jappelli, 1993; Miller, 2003). 
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banks in the screening process will provide valuable insights into the important question as to 
whether banks are operating on a commercial basis or are bedeviled by political interference. 
By examining the role of formal financing in private sector growth, we can develop better 
insights into the sustainability of the private sector as the engine of China’s economic 
expansion. 
 3. Sample and Variables 
3.1 Sample 
Most data used in this study come from the business environment and enterprise 
performance survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey 
Organization of China in early 2003. To achieve a balanced representation of enterprises, the 
sample includes about 2,400 enterprises from the following 18 cities across five regions in 
China: (1) the Central Region: Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou; (2) the 
Northeast Region: Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and Harbin; (3) the Northwest Region: 
Lanzhou and Xi’an; (4) the Southwest Region: Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning; 
and (5) the Coastal Area: Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou (for a review of the 
survey, see Lin, Lin and Song, 2008). Thirteen of the cities are provincial capitals, while the 
remaining five are major industrial cities. The survey includes firms with different ownership 
structures and different sizes. We focus on private firms. An enterprise is classified as a 
private firm if the percentage of the shares owned by the private sector is more than 50%. 
Based on this criterion, there are 1,868 firms in our sample. Furthermore, the survey is 
sampled from 5 manufacturing industries and 5 service industries.
12
 
The survey has two main parts. Part one consists of managers’ responses to questions 
on general information about the firm, management, innovation, market environment, 
relationships with clients and suppliers, location of manufacturing plant, relations with 
government, and international trade. Part two is quantitative information on production, costs, 
employee training, schooling, and wages (based on interviews with the firm’s accountant and 
                                                 
12
 Manufacturing: apparel and leather goods, electronic equipment, electronic components, consumer products, 
and vehicles and vehicle parts; Services: accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, business 
logistics services, communication services, and information technology services. 
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personnel manager). The qualitative questions pertained only to the year 2002 and so we use 
this as the year of our study. 
3.2 Modeling the lending decision 
 To develop a successful commercial lending operation, banks need to set in place 
criteria for evaluating credit risk and deciding the amount of the loans. However, these 
criteria are not observable to the outside world. Even if we have access to a bank’s official 
policies on lending we would still be missing the subjective judgments made by the credit 
officers. We seek to explore inside the black box of lending decisions by testing whether 
certain criteria are associated with the lending decision and the loan amount. These criteria 
include the profitability of the prospective borrower, the experience and incentives of the top 
managers of the borrower, and the governance (board structure) of the borrower. Furthermore, 
we also examine whether the political connections of the borrower are a factor in lending 
decisions.  
 We develop the following model to help explain the access to bank finance and the 
amount of the loan. 
)
(f
ii5i4i3
i2i10i2002
εINDUSTRYβCONTROLS OTHERβGOVERNANCE CORPORATEβ
CONNECTION POLITICALβEPERFORMANC FIRMββNANCEBANKING_FI


 Information on access to loans and the amount of loan is taken from the responses to 
the survey questions.
13
 The independent variables are the performance of the firm, managerial 
experience and incentives, political connections, governance, and a set of controls. The 
independent variables, which are described in detail below, are constrained by the questions 
asked in the survey. We use probit models for specifications where access to bank finance is 
the dependent variable, and use tobit models for those where the size of the bank loan scaled 
by total assets is the dependent variable (to take into account the fact that the loan size is 
censored at zero).  
3.3 Variables 
 Detailed definitions of the variables used in the regressions are shown in Table 2, 
while Table 3 shows the summary statistics. 
                                                 
13
 Note, we use a sample of private non-listed firms and so there are no publicly available financial statements to 
extract or check data. 
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[Tables 2 and 3 Here] 
3.3.1 FINANCEBANKING _  
We use two different variables to capture FINANCEBANKING _ .  Access to Banking 
Finance is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s answer to the question “Do you have 
a loan from a bank or financial institution?” is “Yes”, and zero otherwise.  The second 
variable, Size of Banking Finance, is the amount of the line of credit reported by the 
managers scaled by the firm’s total assets. About 22% of firms disclose that they have a bank 
loan and the mean loan is 4.66% of the total assets.  
3.3.2 FIRM PERFORMANCE 
At the time of the survey (2003), China’s banking system lacked consolidated inter-
bank information sharing on client companies and there was no nation-wide credit rating 
system. Each bank has its own individual information system and way of doing business 
(Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). Banks resort to using the prospective borrowers’ accounting 
statements to make informed inferences about financial condition. We use Lagged ROS as 
our prime measure of FIRM_PERFORMANCE. Lagged Return on Sales (Lagged ROS) is the 
one year lagged EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes) divided by total sales
14
. EBIT is 
used as it represents core earnings and is less likely to have been manipulated. In contrast, net 
income is often confounded by earnings management and the gains and losses from arbitrary 
intra-group asset sales (non-core earnings). Furthermore, discussions with bankers suggest 
than operating income is used in evaluating whether to lend to a private firm. The mean 
(median) Lagged Return on Sales is 0.106 (0.102). 
3.3.3 POLITICAL  CONNECTION 
Political connections, in its broadest scope, may have a favorable effect on bank 
lending decisions (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2005). The 
survey database has three variables that represent different facets of political connections and 
we use these in our model. State Minority Ownership is a dummy variable, which is equal to 
one if the private firms have a state minority shareholding. CEO Government Official is a 
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 We also used Lagged Return on Assets as an alternative performance measure. The empirical results are very 
robust. Although we use both measures, scaling by sales is better than scaling by assets because the values 
placed on assets are sometimes arbitrary. 
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dummy variable that is equal to one if the general manager (this is the CEO in U.S. parlance) 
was a government official before taking a position in the enterprise, and zero otherwise. This 
variable represents cases where the firm might find it easier to borrow because the CEO has a 
former connection with the government. The dummy variable Business Connection is equal 
to one if the firm has business transactions with the government or its affiliates, and zero 
otherwise. It should be noted that lending based on State Ownership and Business Connection 
might not be motivated purely by political considerations and biases. Banks might lend more 
to private firms with state ownership and business connections with the government because 
the banks have more information on these firms. Furthermore, firms with state ownership and 
business relations with governments are more likely to get help from governments in time of 
financial difficulties and thus may be less risky for the banks. 
It is apparent from our dataset that many of the private firms have some sort of 
relations with the government. 3% of private firms have state minority ownership and 22% of 
them have business relations with the government or its affiliates. However, the ability of the 
private sector to extract economic benefits from former political connections may be limited 
as only 5.3% of CEOs of private firms are former government officials.  
3.3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The quality of a firm’s corporate governance should be a concern for banks as they 
make decisions on whether to extend credit.  This is because good corporate governance can 
help reduce credit risks by mitigating the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers and also by improving corporate transparency and the quality of financial 
information (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2007). Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) offer evidence that more 
independent and active boards are associated with a lower cost of debt financing for U.S. 
firms. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) also find that stronger corporate 
governance increases a firm’s probability of receiving an investment-grade credit rating. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms with greater institutional ownership and more 
independent boards enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings in their new debt issues, and 
Graham, Li and Qiu (2008) show that corporate misreporting is associated with tighter bank 
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loan contracts including higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured 
and more covenant restrictions. Chava, Livdan and Purnanandam (2008), however, find that 
stronger shareholder rights (as measured by fewer takeover defenses) is associated with 
costlier bank loans because of the potential conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
bondholders in takeovers. Complementing the above U.S. studies, we examine whether the 
banks in a large emerging market, China, also take the corporate governance of private firms 
into account when they evaluate their loan applications.      
Utilizing the data provided by the survey, we construct two sets of corporate 
governance variables. The first set is related to managerial experience and incentive contracts. 
Managerial incentive contracts can alleviate moral hazard problems, reduce agency costs, 
induce managers to maximize firm value and thus reduce the credit default risk (Cull and Xu, 
2003).  Overall, the existence of incentive contracts and the CEO’s work experience provide 
information about management’s motivations and abilities and thus signals a firm’s quality. 
We use three salient characteristics of the CEO in our model. CEO Experience is the number 
of years the CEO has held the top management position at the firm or with previous firms. 
Banks may place more trust in those firms whose CEOs have substantial top management 
experience. The mean (median) value for experience is 6.7 years (6 years), although there is 
considerable variability across firms as shown by the standard deviation of 4.7 years. 
Managerial Ownership takes the value of one if the manager’s response to the question of 
“Does the general manager own company stocks?” is affirmative and zero otherwise. Annual 
Salary System is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the annual salary system is 
adopted and zero otherwise
15
. Incentive contracts and stock ownership provide incentives to 
make the CEO work harder and act as a kind of intangible collateral in the eyes of the lenders 
                                                 
15
 In recent years, the “annual salary system” (Nianxinzhi) has become increasingly popular because the 
central government has gradually recognized that compensation structure is one of the key elements in 
enhancing enterprise productivity and efficiency. In November 2003, the State Asset Management Bureau 
(SAMB), in an effort to further the wage reform, issued a circular to implement formally the incentive-based 
annual salary system in 189 SOEs directly owned by the central government. According to the circular, 
managerial compensation in the “annual salary system” consists of two major parts: fixed base salary and 
performance salary.  This is very similar to the “salary plus bonus” compensation package offered by firms in 
developed market economies. In addition to the largest SOEs, the annual salary system has also been widely 
adopted by the private non-listed firms.  
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We therefore expect positive coefficients on these variables. 
Table 3 shows that 36 percent of CEOs have an ownership interest in the firm they manage. 
More than 20 percent of firms have incentive pay systems for the CEO. 
The second set of corporate governance variables is related to the salient 
characteristics of the board. The board of directors monitors managers on behalf of the 
shareholders and if they are effective in their duties, they should deter wealth destroying or 
other wanton behavior of the CEO and top management. Other stakeholders, including 
lenders, should benefit from this monitoring. We capture board effectiveness with three 
variables. Board Ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the directors on the board. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that share ownership can align the incentives of outsiders 
with shareholders. The average board shareholding is 29.8%. Duality is a dummy variable 
coded one when the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. Concentrating power in one 
person’s hands runs the risk that any abuse of power will be harder to prevent (Jensen, 1993). 
About 28% of firms have a joint CEO-chairman. Independent Director is the number of 
independent directors on the board
16
. Independent directors are more likely to deter the top 
executives from pursuing personal objectives and, instead, force management to focus on 
firm value (Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui, 2006).
17
  
3.3.5 Other Control Variables 
We include control variables to capture possible confounding effects. Other Controls 
is a vector of control variables, which comprise of Firm Size, Firm Age and Business Group. 
Firm Size is measured as the log of total assets and Firm Age is the log of the number of years 
since the enterprise was established. Business Group is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 
if a firm belongs to a business group. We expect positive coefficients on Firm Size and Firm 
Age as larger and older firms are better known to bankers. A negative sign is, however, 
expected on Business Group because firms belonging to a business group may have access to 
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 We do not use the board independence ratio here because some firms do not have a board in our sample.  
17
 In addition to managerial compensation contracts and board characteristics, concentration of ownership may 
also be a concern to banks because firms with a more concentrated ownership structure are plagued less by 
managerial problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Unfortunately, the survey does not include any information on 
the shareholdings of the various large shareholders. We therefore have to leave this important issue for future 
research.   
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finance through the internal capital market and thus have a lower demand for external bank 
loans
18
 (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Khanna and Tice, 2001). Additional control 
variables are GDP per Capita (of the city where the firm is located) and City Population. 
Industry dummies are also included in the regressions. 
We also check the correlations among the firm specific variables and find that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Most of the correlation coefficients are below 0.3, 
which gives us confidence to include these variables in the models simultaneously. For 
brevity, the correlation matrix is not reported but it is available from the authors upon request. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Base Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report our baseline models. In order to get some sense of the 
magnitude of the effects, the coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal 
effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the Probit and Tobit 
regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in 
the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
Lagged Return on Sales (ROS) is significantly and positively related to both Access to 
Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance. This result holds irrespective of various 
period lags and alternative proxies for a firm’s previous performance19.  A one standard 
deviation increase in a firm’s one year lag return on sales is associated with an increase of 
about 5 percentage points in the probability of obtaining bank credit, depending on the 
specification of the model (Table 4). A one standard deviation increase in a firm’s return on 
sales performance will increase the scaled loan size by 1.09 percentage points (Table 5). 
Given the fact that the mean of scaled loan size is 4.66 percentage points, the effect is not 
trivial. Our results are consistent with those obtained by Cull and Xu (2005), which suggest 
that banks tend to allocate loans to private firms with better operating performance. The 
                                                 
18
 The survey has no additional information on the characteristics of the business group. As a result, we are not 
able to examine the issue of how the characteristics of the business group affect credit allocation and so we have 
to leave this important question for future research. 
19
 We use one-year lag performance indicators, two-year lag performance indicators and the average of the two. 
Moreover, we employ return on sales and return on assets as two alternative proxies for firm performance. The 
positive effect of previous performance on firms’ access to finance and credit size remain significant.  Note, the 
firms are not listed and so we are unable to use stock market measures of performance. 
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results indicate that banks use commercial judgment in providing loans to private firms
20
. In 
the absence of reliable repayment history information and a reliable credit scoring system, 
banks appear to rely on a company’s financial reports when conducting a credit screening 
process for loan applications from private firms.  
[Tables 4 and 5 Here] 
Columns 2 and 4 of Tables 4 and 5 report the effects of political connections. State 
Minority Ownership is related positively to both Access to Banking Finance and Size of 
Banking Finance although it is only significant for the models of Access to Banking Finance. 
This suggests that state minority ownership is instrumental for getting access to bank loans. 
The coefficients for the other two political connections variables (CEO Government Officials 
and Business Connections) are not statistically significant (and so we do not include them in 
column 4). Consistent with prior research studies, which document that political connections 
are important for listed firms (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio et al., 2005), our results suggest that 
political connections (in the form of the state’s minority ownership) play a role in private 
firms when it comes to borrowing from state owned banks. As we have discussed previously, 
lending to firms that have state minority ownership may not be necessarily driven by purely 
political considerations and biases. Banks may lend to these firms because of informational 
reasons as well as the possible bailouts or other supports from the government. Given the data 
we have, it is not possible to distinguish between these reasons for the positive sign on 
minority state ownership. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 4 and 5 show the effects of corporate governance. The 
CEO experience and incentive variables are positively related to both Access to Banking 
Finance and Size of Banking Finance, suggesting that banks tend to allocate bank loans to 
firms with more experienced and incentive-driven CEOs.  A one year increase in CEO 
experience is associated with a 0.7% increase in the probability of getting credit from banks 
and a 0.102% to 0.105% increase in the loan size scaled by total assets. The probability of 
getting bank credit for private firms that have adopted the Annual Salary System dominates 
                                                 
20
 Previous studies (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2003) find no relationship between firm performance and access to 
finance in a sample of SOEs. However, when private firms are competing with each other for bank loans, it is 
not too surprising to observe that firm performance plays an important role in bank loan decisions. 
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those without such incentive payment schemes by 7.3% to 7.5% depending on the model 
specification. Firms with such incentive arrangements also enjoy larger scaled bank loans in 
the order of 1.84% to 1.88%.  Similar results also hold for CEO ownership variables. For 
example, if the CEO owns shares in the firm the Access to Banking Finance increases by 5% 
and the Size of Banking Finance increases by about 0.692%. The use of managerial 
experience and incentive compatibility as signals for borrowers’ quality by Chinese banks is 
somewhat comparable with the use of information from credit bureaus and proprietary 
information from financial institutions for small business credit scoring in the U.S. and other 
developed economies. This information relies mostly on information on the owner rather than 
firm itself and can significantly reduce the loan processing cost (Kallberg and Udell, 2003).  
Turning to the board characteristic variables, CEO duality is related negatively to 
Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance at the 5% level, suggesting banks are 
more likely to make larger loans to firms when two separate persons occupy the positions of 
CEO and board chairperson. Board Ownership, on the other hand, is related positively to 
Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance. This provides support for the 
positive role of directors’ share ownership in signaling a firm’s quality to the banks. 
Independent Director is related positively to Size of Banking Finance at the 1% level, which 
suggests that banks tend to allocate larger loans to firms with more independent directors. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with banks analyzing the board structures of prospective 
borrowers when deciding whether to lend to private firms and the amount to lend. Therefore, 
good governance mechanisms serve as an effective signal for borrowers’ quality in the eyes 
of banks, and thereby facilitate access to formal finance.  
4.2 Further Tests 
Theoretically, in a world with fixed transaction costs and information asymmetries, 
small firms with a demand for loans face higher transaction costs, and face higher risk 
premiums since they are typically less transparent and have less collateral to offer. In other 
words, small firms are more informationally opaque and thus riskier than large firms in the 
eyes of the banks. As a result, small and medium enterprises tend to have a lower capacity to 
signal their quality because of their less reliable financial information and lower market 
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power. The results in Tables 4 and 5 attest to the size effect. To take a closer look at whether 
the experimental variables have different impacts across large and small firms, we divide our 
sample into two groups according their asset size. A firm is classified as a large (small) firm 
if its asset size is above (below) the sample median. In unreported summary statistics of our 
sample, 33% of the large firms get access to bank finance while only 10.8% of the small 
firms get access to bank finance. The average scaled loan size for large firms is 7.06% and it 
is only 2.23% for small firms. 
Table 6 reports the results on the determinants of loan access for large and small firms 
separately.  For large firms, financial performance is related positively and significantly to 
Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance (Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 in Table 6). 
However, there is no significant relation for small firms (Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 in Table 6).  
The results suggest that accounting performance is a positive signal for large firms but not for 
small firms, which may be partly attributed to the unreliable nature of financial reports of 
small firms.    
For large firms only, State Minority Ownership is found to exert a positive effect on 
Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance. For large firms, CEO experience is 
related positively and significantly to Access to Banking Finance, and ownership of stock by 
the CEO is significantly and positively related to Access to Banking Finance and Size of 
Banking Finance.  Except for Annual Salary System and Board Ownership in the Access to 
Banking Finance regressions, political connections and corporate governance do not serve as 
useful signals for small firms. Overall, the results corroborate our contention that small firms 
lack the ability to signal their quality to banks. 
[Table 6] 
 Firms in our sample operate in different industries so they are subject to different 
industry conditions such as market competition, asset structure and level of information 
asymmetry (Aggarwal and Zhao, 2007).  Varying industrial conditions provide firms with 
differing opportunities to earn profits and pose different credit risks on the banks. As a 
control for this, we include industry dummies to remove the possible confounding industry 
effects. To gain further insights, we also divide our sample firms into services and 
                                                                                              18 
manufacturing firms to examine whether banks use different criteria in evaluating borrowers 
from different industries. 
 Table 7 reports the results on the determinants of loan access and size of bank finance 
for service and manufacturing firms, separately. Two important differences between services 
and manufacturing industries stand out. First, financial performance is related positively and 
significantly to Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance for manufacturing 
firms only (Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 in Table 8) and they are not significant for the service 
firms (Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 in Table 8). Firms in the service industry face lower barriers to 
entry and are therefore subject to more threats from potential entrants. Consequently, the 
historical profitability of a service industry firm is a less informative indicator of current or 
future performance. Banks will therefore place less weight on ROS when deciding whether to 
lend to service industry firms.  Second, State Minority Ownership has a positive and 
significant effect on Access to Banking Finance and Size of Banking Finance for service 
firms but not for manufacturing firms. This may be due to the fact that services firms tend to 
have fewer tangible assets to serve as collaterals than manufacturing firms. The banks 
therefore put a greater emphasis on state ownership, which can serve as a kind of implicit 
collateral.  Board characteristics appear to be more important in lending decisions for 
manufacturing firms. In sum, our results suggest that the banks in China take different 
industry conditions into account when they extend loans to the private sector.     
[Table 7] 
 In addition to different industry conditions, our sample firms also operate under 
various institutional environments because different regions in China are moving towards a 
market-based economy at different paces (Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007).  In order to ensure 
that our results are not caused by institutional heterogeneity, we control for different market 
development conditions by using the NERI (National Economic Research Institute of China) 
marketization indexes (Fan and Wong, 2006); these indexes have been employed also by Fan 
et al. (2007) and Chen et at. (2006)
21
. Tables 8 and 9 show that our results are robust
22
 after 
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 Specifically, the NERI market development index (known as the marketization index) is based on the 
following indicators of a well-functioning market system: (i) The relationship between provincial government 
and markets, including the size of the provincial government; the financial burden of firms besides normal taxes; 
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controlling for the different involvement of the government in the economy (Government and 
Market) as well as different degrees of private sector development (Development of Non-state 
Sector), product market development (Development of Product Market), banking 
liberalization (Banking Sector Marketization) and legal infrastructure development (Legal 
Environment). Furthermore, Banking Sector Marketization is found to exert a positive and 
significant effect on access to bank loans and size of the loan. In contrast, the other market 
development  indexes are not significant. 
[Tables 8 and 9] 
To gain further insights into the impact of the development of the banking sector on 
our results, we split the sample into two groups, firms located in areas with a more developed 
banking sector and those located in areas with a less developed banking sector. Since the 
banking marketization index ranges from 0 to 10, the sample is divided into two sub-samples 
using the natural cutoff point 5 and we examine how the degree of banking marketization 
affects the determinants of loan access and size of loan to the private firms.  The results are 
reported in Table 10.  Banking marketization changes the relative importance of financial 
performance and state minority ownership as determinants of bank loans. While financial 
performance is related positively and significantly to both Access to Banking Finance and 
Size of Banking Finance for firms in regions with a more marketized banking sector, a 
positive but non-significant relation is found for firms in regions with a less marketized 
banking sector. On the other hand, state minority ownership is instrumental in obtaining bank 
loans for firms in areas with a less developed banking sector. It, however, plays no role in 
lending decisions for firms in regions with a more developed banking sector. Our results 
                                                                                                                                                        
and the level of government intervention and efficiency. (ii) Development of non-state sectors, including the 
ratio of private sector employees and total labor force and the ratio of private sector and total industrial outputs. 
(iii) Development of product markets, including the extent of price deregulation and the size of inter-regional 
trade barriers. (iv) Development of factor markets, including competition and liberalization in the banking sector; 
improvement in investment policies and environment (FDI as a percentage of total investment); and labor 
mobility. (v) Development of a legal framework for property protection and contract enforcement, including the 
development of market institutions (the number of law firms, accounting offices and independent auditing 
offices adjusted for differences in population); market order (the number of cases of trademark violations); 
property rights protection (the number of patent applications and actual registrations); and consumer protection 
(the number of legal cases involving consumer complaints). For each of the above indicators, Fan and Wang 
(2006) assign a value between 0 and 10, with the higher values indicating a higher degree of market 
development and economic freedom. 
22
 For the sake of brevity, we omit CEO government official and Business Connection as they are not significant. 
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suggest that banks in China are becoming more commercialized as China continues to reform 
its banking sector. While the importance of political connections will decline over time as the 
banking sector becomes more developed, financial performance will become a more 
important determinant of credit allocation to the private sector, and thus more bank loans will 
be allocated to firms with greater profitability.  
[Table 10] 
5. Conclusion 
 A major contributor to China’s growth has been the spectacular expansion of the 
private sector. This expansion is even more remarkable given the lack of a conventional 
financial infrastructure in China (Allen et al., 2005). In this study, we seek to determine 
whether state banks do, in fact, lend to private non-listed firms and what criteria they use in 
evaluating loan applications. The data come from a survey of private businesses and so our 
models are constrained by the information collected. 
 We find that obtaining a loan is quite difficult, but commercial criteria appear to be 
used in banks’ decision making. In particular, a firm’s profitability is used as a criterion in 
granting loans and in determining the amount borrowed. This finding is much more 
pronounced for large firms, firms in the manufacturing industry, and firms in regions with a 
more developed banking sector.  Despite these promising developments, political connections 
via state minority ownership still plays a significant role in getting access for bank loans for 
large firms, firms in the service industry and firms in regions with a less developed banking 
sector. China’s banking sector is in a transitional stage where credit allocation is subject to 
the influences of both economic and political factors. Given the continuing bank reforms in 
China, we expect that bank loans to the private sector will increasingly be allocated based on 
commercial considerations in the coming years.   
We find that in the absence of credit bureaus and the exchange of loan information 
across the banking sector, banks rely on corporate governance as signals for borrowers’ 
quality.  Our study therefore makes a useful complement to the literature that documents the 
positive roles of corporate governance in reducing the costs of debt financing. We show that, 
in a lending environment with severe asymmetric information, good corporate governance 
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can serve as organization collateral to facilitate access to bank loans.  
We also find that small private firms in China have a lower capacity to signal their 
quality to the banks. The lack of effective signals for small firms indicates that outside 
guarantee services could play a useful role in facilitating private firms’ access to bank loans.  
The establishment of a nation-wide credit scoring system and an inter-bank information 
sharing database on loan repayment history would substantially reduce transaction costs and 
reduce information asymmetry in the lending process. However, China’s credit guarantee 
companies currently serve only about 1 percent of the country’s SMEs and so there is an 
urgent need for China to develop additional standard credit guarantee services.   
The Chinese government continues to recognize the importance of the banking sector 
and has promulgated further rules and regulations that will help create a more level playing 
field between private, public and mixed private-public firms. The rules also require banks to 
use commercial criteria in making loans and to make them accountable for making bad 
decisions. As examples, in July 2004 and May 2005, the government promulgated Guidelines 
on Commercial Banks’ Due Diligence Performance in Credit Business and Guidelines on 
Banks’ Lending to Small Enterprises. These require each bank to clearly define the 
responsibilities and due diligence assessment criteria for every function involved in the 
lending process and create a fair credit market and competitive lending culture to firms with 
differing ownership structures. The recent listing of state banks on domestic and foreign stock 
markets exerts external market pressures on banks and should reinforce the use of 
commercial criteria in lending decisions and reduce any discrimination against small private 
firms. In light of this, we expect that the financing of small private firms will, in the fullness 
of time, come to resemble the situation in the U.S. and other developed nations. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the state owned and non-state owned economy (1995-2005) 
 
  Number of 
Employees 
in Nonstate 
enterprises 
(million) 
Employment in 
Nonstate 
enterprises to 
Total urban 
Employment  % 
Industrial 
Production 
of SOEs 
(billion) 
a
 
Industrial 
Production of 
Nonstate 
enterprises to 
Total 
Industrial 
Production  % 
Tax 
Revenue 
from 
SOEs 
(billion) 
Tax Revenue 
from Nonstate 
enterprises to 
Total Tax 
Revenue  % 
1985 48.71 29.81 630.2 35.14 32.89 27.46 
1986 56.55 29.8 697.1 37.73 37.44 29.3 
1987 65.09 29.96 825 40.27 41.85 30.4 
1988 75.93 30.03 1,035.10 43.2 49.76 31.5 
1989 79.23 30.03 1,234.30 43.94 60.3 32.05 
1990 85.99 29.76 1,306.40 45.39 61.79 31.41 
1991 83.21 38.94 1,495.50 43.83 67.19 31.71 
1992 102.46 36.84 1,782.40 48.48 76.9 33.03 
1993 123.39 37.92 2,272.50 53.05 144.68 36.44 
1994 188.18 39.1 2,620.10 62.66 174.77 36.96 
1995 218.89 41.02 3,122.00 66.03 222.04 40.26 
1996 282.36 43.26 2,836.10 71.52 245.17 45.31 
1997 322.32 45.35 2,902.80 74.48 299.64 43.67 
1998 91.93 58.1 3,362.10 50.37 397.8 45.95 
1999 89.5 61.75 3,557.12 51.08 489.12 50.49 
2000 90.12 65 4,055.44 52.66 693.6 58.5 
2001 95.56 68.09 4,240.85 55.57 954.2 64 
2002 104.02 71.09 4,517.90 59.22 1127.39 67.78 
2003 114.4 73.18 5,340.79 62.46 1409.86 70.53 
2004 125.66 74.66 7,022.90 65.19 1833.89 72.8 
2005 130.07 76.26 8375.00 66.72   
 
Note
 a
:  
For industrial production, there is a change in classification of SOE in 1998.  SOEs include only wholly 
state-owned enterprises for years prior to 1998. Since 1998, SOEs include wholly state-owned and state-
controlled enterprises. “Nonstate enterprises” include foreign investment firms and Sino-foreign joint ventures. 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, various years. Tax Yearbook of China, various years.     
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Table 2: Definitions of variables 
Variables Definition 
Banking finance  
Access to banking finance 
a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s answer to the 
question “Do you have a loan from a bank or financial 
institution?” is “Yes”, zero otherwise 
Size of banking finance 
the amount of the line of credit reported by the managers scaled by 
the firm’s total assets 
Firm performance  
Lagged ROS                                         one year lagged operating profit divided by total sales 
Lagged ROA                                    one year lagged operating profit divided by total assets 
Managerial characteristics and 
incentives 
 
CEO experience                      
the manager’s response to the question “How many years has the 
general manager held this position in the firm and previous firms?” 
CEO ownership  
a dummy variable that equals one if the manager’s response to the 
question “Does the general manager own company stocks?” is “Yes”, 
zero otherwise 
Annual salary system 
a dummy variable that equals one if the manager’s answer to the 
question “Is the general manager’s wage paid annually [i.e., Nian Xin 
Zhi]?”, zero otherwise 
Political connection  
State Minority Shareholder 
A dummy variable that equals one if the state is a minority 
shareholder of the private firm 
CEO government official 
a dummy variable that equals one if the manager’s answer to the 
question “Before becoming general manager in this firm, what was 
his/her position?” is “government official”, zero otherwise 
Business Connection 
a dummy variable that equals one if the share of the firm’s sales to 
the government is larger than zero, zero otherwise 
Corporate governance  
Board Size number of directors on a firm’s board 
Duality 
a dummy variable that equals one if the general manager possesses 
dual positions both as a general manager and board chair, zero 
otherwise 
Independent Director Number of independent directors on a firm’s board 
Board Ownership Proportion of a firm’s shares owned by board members 
Other controls  
Group 
A dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a business 
group, zero otherwise 
Firm Age logarithm form of years since the firm was established 
Firm Size             logarithm form of a firm’s total assets (in 1,000 yuan) 
GDP per Capita 
logarithm form of gross domestic product per capita of the city where 
the firm is located 
City Population logarithm form of population of the city where the firm is located 
Market Development 
(Marketization) indexes 
Five categories of market development (marketization) indexes: 
Government and Market; Development of Non-State Sector; 
Development of Product Market; Banking Sector Marketization; 
Legal Environment 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of main variables 
Variables Number of obs. Mean Median Standard deviation 
Access to banking finance 1814 0.222 0 0.415 
Size of banking finance  1775 4.66 0 12.44 
[% of total asset]     
     
Firm performance     
Lagged ROS 1841 0.106 0.102 0.430 
     
Political Connection     
State Minority Shareholder 1869 0.030 0 0.172 
CEO government official 1856 0.053 0 0.225 
Business Connection 1869 0.220 0 0.415 
     
Managerial characteristics and 
incentives 
  
 
 
CEO experience 1868 6.753 6 4.696 
CEO ownership 1869 0.357 0 0.479 
Annual salary system 1869 0.204 0 0.403 
     
Board Characteristics     
Board Ownership 1840 0.298 0 0.415 
Duality 1860 0.283 0 0.451 
Independent Director 1856 0.484 0 1.253 
     
Other controls      
Firm Age 1869 2.197 2.260 0.707 
Firm Size 1834 9.427 9.326 2.239 
GDP per Capita 1869 10.00 10.00 0.374 
City population  1869 5.394 5.532 0.617 
     
Marketization Indexes     
Government and Market 1869 7.00 6.90 0.935 
Development of Non-state Sector 1869 5.81 5.24 2.962 
Development of Product Market 1869 7.47 7.43 1.605 
Banking Sector Marketization 1869 5.98 5.87 2.302 
Legal Environment 1869 4.22 3.29 2.164 
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Table 4: Probit regressions on the determinants of access to bank finance 
Variables Access to Bank Finance 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Performance     
Lagged ROS 0.116 0.118  0.110 0.111  
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.011]** [0.011]** 
Political Connection     
State minority ownership  0.128  0.114 
  [0.023]**  [0.047]** 
CEO government official  -0.039    
  [0.416]   
Business Connection  0.024   
  [0.312]   
Managerial Incentives     
CEO experience   0.007 0.007  
   [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
CEO ownership   0.050 0.049  
   [0.042]** [0.044]** 
Annual salary system   0.073 0.075  
   [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Board Characteristics     
Duality   -0.056 -0.054  
   [0.017]** [0.021]** 
Independent Director   0.010 0.009 
   [0.166] [0.174] 
Board Ownership   0.059 0.056 
   [0.039]** [0.051]* 
Other controls     
Business Group  -0.054 -0.054 -0.050 -0.051 
 [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.029]** [0.026]** 
Firm Age -0.010  -0.013  -0.012 -0.014  
 [0.452] [0.367] [0.400] [0.336] 
Firm Size 0.068 0.065  0.067 0.065 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.020  -0.015  -0.029 -0.027 
 [0.502] [0.615] [0.337] [0.366] 
City Population -0.025  -0.023  -0.034 -0.033  
 [0.153]* [0.200] [0.063]* [0.072]* 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1723 1716 1683 1683 
The dependent variable, Access to Bank Finance is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has at least one 
loan from a bank, zero otherwise. Other variables are defined as previously. Please see table 2 for detailed 
definitions. Two-tailed P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at 
the means of the independent variables from the Probit regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is 
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes 
from 0 to 1.
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Table 5:  Tobit regressions on the size of bank finance 
Variables Size of Bank Finance 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Performance     
Lagged ROS 2.542 2.585 2.480 2.478 
 [0.012]** [0.010]*** [0.011]** [0.011]** 
Political Connection     
State minority ownership  1.811  1.773 
  [0.138]  [0.208] 
CEO government official  -1.000   
  [0.284]   
Business Connection  0.700   
  [0.246]   
Managerial Incentives     
CEO experience   0.102 0.105 
   [0.028]** [0.023]** 
CEO ownership   0.629 0.629 
   [0.241] [0.239] 
Annual salary system   1.838 1.880 
   [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
Board Characteristics     
Duality   -1.082 -1.054 
   [0.024]** [0.028]** 
Independent Director   0.444 0.438 
   [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
Board Ownership   1.285 1.234 
   [0.034]** [0.041]** 
Other controls     
Business Group  -0.247 -0.213 -0.285 -0.289 
 [0.633] [0.678] [0.578] [0.572] 
Firm Age -0.358 -0.412 -0.274 -0.306 
 [0.259] [0.194] [0.394] [0.341] 
Firm Size 1.364 1.300 1.265 1.241 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.636 -0.528 -0.816 -0.790 
 [0.331] [0.417] [0.203] [0.218] 
City Population -0.756 -0.695 -0.923 -0.907 
 [0.070]* [0.093]* [0.023]** [0.026]** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1689 1682 1650 1650 
The dependent variable, Size of Banking Finance is the amount of the line of credit reported by the managers 
scaled by the firm’s total assets. Other variables are defined as previously. Please see table 2 for detailed 
definitions. Two-tailed P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at 
the means of the independent variables from the Tobit regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is 
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes 
from 0 to 1. 
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Table 6: Split-sample analysis according to firm size 
Variables Access to Bank Finance Size of Bank Finance 
  Large Small Large Small 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Lagged ROS 0.548 0.58 0.116 0.046 12.305 13.218 10.214 8.363 
 [0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.670] [0.859] [0.040]** [0.026]** [0.380] [0.470] 
Political connection         
State minority ownership 0.525 0.413 0.078 0.11 11.299 9.138 -4.233 -0.561 
 [0.011]** [0.057]* [0.863] [0.806] [0.039]** [0.101] [0.822] [0.977] 
CEO  government official 0.07  -0.657  -1.678  -21.445  
 [0.779]  [0.143]  [0.808]  [0.191]  
Business Connection 0.16  0.006  3.616  2.941  
 [0.150]  [0.970]  [0.239]  [0.637]  
Board Characteristics         
Duality  -0.182  -0.237  -4.154  -9.396 
  [0.118]  [0.150]  [0.190]  [0.174] 
Independent Director  0.036  0.044  2.479  2.161 
  [0.256]  [0.362]  [0.004]***  [0.257] 
Board Ownership  0.322  0.136  6.176  11.879 
  [0.021]**  [0.467]  [0.093]*  [0.122] 
Managerial incentives         
CEO experience 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.352 0.384 0.65 0.861 
 [0.025]** [0.027]** [0.097]* [0.082]* [0.205] [0.169] [0.234] [0.125] 
CEO ownership 0.334 0.268 0.006 0.003 7.622 6.152 -1.197 -3.945 
 [0.001]*** [0.029]** [0.964] [0.982] [0.008]*** [0.059]* [0.810] [0.478] 
Annual salary system 0.214 0.217 0.326 0.339 9.203 9.452 5.465 5.343 
 [0.038]** [0.039]** [0.047]** [0.041]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.395] [0.412] 
Other controls         
Business Group  -0.036 -0.067 -1.232 -1.325 1.482 -0.015 -12.729 -14.44 
 [0.724] [0.524] [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.604] [0.996] [0.174] [0.137] 
Firm Age -0.018 -0.004 -0.184 -0.191 -2.178 -0.927 -3.721 -5.023 
 [0.786] [0.956] [0.057]* [0.051]* [0.244] [0.617] [0.353] [0.237] 
Firm Size 0.234 0.254 0.255 0.259 5.555 5.826 7.899 7.592 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.102 -0.107 0.000  -0.01 -3.944 -3.912 -2.421 -3.007 
 [0.455] [0.441] [1.000] [0.963] [0.294] [0.296] [0.766] [0.716] 
City Population 0.008 -0.011 -0.355 -0.374 -1.14 -1.755 -15.083 -15.499 
 [0.925] [0.901] [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.643] [0.473] [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 845 826 871 857 824 806 858 844 
We split the sample firms into large firms (firm size measured by log total assets above the sample median) and small firms (firm size below sample median), and repeat the regressions as 
specified in Table 4 and Table 5 within each sub-sample. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are based on large firms. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are based on small firms. Columns (1) to (4) are 
based on Probit models. Columns (5) to (8) are based on Tobit models. Two-tailed P-values are in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.
 32 
Table 7: Split-sample analysis according to industry   
Variables Access to Bank Finance Size of Bank Finance 
 Service Manufacturing Service Manufacturing 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Lagged ROS 0.250 0.197 0.530 0.529 0.767 1.247 16.455 17.029 
 [0.540] [0.634] [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.993] [0.893] [0.006]*** [0.004]*** 
Political connection         
State minority ownership 1.373 1.330 0.234 0.172 26.458 22.673 5.696 4.216 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.254] [0.414] [0.006]*** [0.027]** [0.351] [0.449] 
CEO  government official -0.142  -0.139  -4.500  -4.249  
 [0.686]  [0.551]  [0.658]  [0.557]  
Business Connection -0.240  0.116  -5.011  3.967  
 [0.464]  [0.217]  [0.441]  [0.179]  
Managerial incentives         
CEO experience 0.057 0.058 0.020 0.021 0.618 0.684 0.429 0.513 
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.020]** [0.016]** [0.278] [0.250] [0.104] [0.053]** 
CEO ownership 0.538 0.433 0.166 0.154 10.944 7.373 3.326 2.347 
 [0.026]** [0.088]* [0.049]** [0.115] [0.037]** [0.249] [0.206] [0.427] 
Annual salary system 0.417 0.422 0.231 0.235 7.079 5.480 8.637 8.722 
 [0.099]* [0.106] [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.260] [0.399] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Board Characteristics         
Duality  -0.215  -0.243  0.057  -7.204 
  [0.437]  [0.016]**  [0.993]  [0.020]** 
Independent Director  -0.063  0.047  0.972  2.469 
  [0.522]  [0.103]  [0.562]  [0.004]*** 
Board Ownership  0.367  0.194  8.792  6.019 
  [0.230]  [0.096]*  [0.245]  [0.084]* 
Other controls         
Business Group  -0.241 -0.146 -0.146 -0.200 11.795 12.785 -1.270 -3.477 
 [0.369] [0.606] [0.123] [0.040]** [0.043]** [0.037]** [0.676] [0.261] 
Firm Age 0.077 0.058 -0.100 -0.178 2.895 4.040 -3.831 -2.994 
 [0.634] [0.772] [0.093]* [0.199] [0.381] [0.249] [0.042]** [0.115] 
Firm Size 0.275 0.277 0.232 0.241 4.551 4.682 6.482 6.690 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.529 -0.530 -0.054 -0.058 -19.937 -19.842 -2.059 -2.006 
 [0.112] [0.109] [0.649] [0.620] [0.011]** [0.016]** [0.578] [0.587] 
City Population -0.005 -0.002 -0.133 -0.155 -4.730 -4.489 -4.666 -5.131 
 [0.977] [0.992] [0.065]* [0.035]** [0.284] [0.331] [0.049]** [0.030]** 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 356 348 1360 1335 350 343 1332 1307 
We split the sample firms into service firms and manufacturing firms, and repeat the regressions as specified in Table 4 and Table 5 within each sub-sample. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) are 
based on service firms. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are based on manufacturing firms. Columns (1) to (4) are based on Probit models. Columns (5) to (8) are based on Tobit models. Two-tailed 
P-values are in brackets.*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Probit regressions on the access to bank finance with marketization index 
We repeat the regressions as specified in Table 4 with five categories of marketization indices. Each index 
enters into regression column by column separately. The remaining variables are defined as previously. The 
detailed definitions can be found in table 2. Two-tailed P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Variables Access to Bank Finance 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lagged ROS 0.419 0.421  0.412 0.439 0.409 
 [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.008]*** [0.013]** 
State minority ownership 0.377 0.361 0.361 0.388 0.367 
 [0.046]** [0.058]* [0.058]* [0.039]** [0.053]* 
CEO experience 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.025  
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
CEO ownership 0.181 0.180 0.182 0.175 0.184 
 [0.047]** [0.047]** [0.046]** [0.053]* [0.043]** 
Annual salary system 0.262 0.260  0.273 0.251 0.271 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.002]*** 
Duality -0.215 -0.216 -0.207 -0.220 -0.210 
 [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.026]** [0.018] [0.025]** 
Independent Director 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.035 
 [0.174] [0.171] [0.182] [0.160] [0.184] 
Board Ownership 0.210 0.209 0.216 0.205 0.213 
 [0.051]* [0.052]* [0.046]** [0.056]* [0.048]** 
Other Controls      
Business Group  -0.201 -0.202 -0.196 -0.201 -0.200 
 [0.026]** [0.026]** [0.031]** [0.027]** [0.027]** 
Firm Age -0.053  -0.052  -0.058 -0.049 -0.057 
 [0.341] [0.347] [0.304] [0.379] [0.308] 
Firm Size 0.246 0.245 0.253 0.239  0.251 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.108 -0.125 -0.034 -0.154  -0.032 
 [0.344] [0.315] [0.796] [0.176] [0.813] 
City Population -0.120 -0.120  -0.134  -0.123  -0.135 
 [0.083]* [0.078]* [0.054]* [0.068]* [0.051]* 
Government and Market 0.012     
 [0.776]     
Development of Non-state Sector  0.007    
  [0.637]    
Development of Product Market   -0.036   
   [0.227]   
Banking Sector Marketization    0.037  
    [0.029]**  
Legal Environment     -0.023 
     [0.320] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1683 1683 1683 1683 1683 
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Table 9: Tobit regressions on the size of bank finance with marketization index 
We repeat the regressions as specified in Table 5 with five categories of marketization indices. Each index 
enters into regression column by column separately. The remaining variables are defined as previously. The 
detailed definitions can be found in table 2. Two-tailed P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables Size of Bank Finance 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lagged ROS 13.295 13.317 13.069 13.907 13.083 
 [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.012]** [0.008]*** [0.012]** 
State minority ownership 8.218 8.268 7.792 8.476 7.926 
 [0.132] [0.130] [0.155] [0.119] [0.147] 
CEO experience 0.549 0.546 0.560 0.518 0.558  
 [0.026]** [0.027]** [0.023]** [0.036]** [0.024]** 
CEO ownership 3.146 3.154 3.256 2.945 3.272 
 [0.247] [0.246] [0.232] [0.277] [0.229] 
Annual salary system 8.587 8.564 8.952 8.060 8.905 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Duality -5.951 -5.997 -5.828 -6.077 -5.876 
 [0.036]** [0.035]** [0.040]** [0.032]** [0.039]** 
Independent Director 2.333 2.337 2.312 2.379 2.314 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Board Ownership 6.448 6.415 6.576 6.309 6.540 
 [0.044]** [0.045]** [0.046]** [0.048]** [0.041]** 
Other controls      
Business Group  -1.488 -1.535 -1.513 -1.519 -1.555 
 [0.597] [0.585] [0.591] [0.588] [0.580] 
Firm Age -1.558 -1.543  -1.656 -1.444 -1.635 
 [0.360] [0.364] [0.331] [0.396] [0.337] 
Firm Size 6.457 6.440 6.625 6.267 6.585 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -4.995 -5.768 -3.510 -6.517 -3.863 
 [0.151] [0.118] [0.353] [0.060]* [0.332] 
City Population -4.527 -4.645  -4.893  -4.903  -4.851 
 [0.037]** [0.031]** [0.024]** [0.022]** [0.026]** 
Government and Market 1.366     
 [0.298]     
Development of Non-state Sector  0.476    
  [0.279]    
Development of Product Market   -0.341   
   [0.686]   
Banking Sector Marketization    1.529  
    [0.003]***  
Legal Environment     -0.102 
     [0.879] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 
                                                                                       35 
Table 10: Split sample analysis according to regional banking marketization index 
Variables Access to Bank Finance Size of Bank Finance 
  Poor Bank Marketization Good Bank Marketization Poor Bank Marketization Good Bank Marketization 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Lagged ROS 0.419 0.425 0.447 0.474 11.12 11.958 14.089 14.746 
 [0.139] [0.139] [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.187] [0.186] [0.002]*** [0.000]*** 
Political Connection         
State minority ownership 0.685 0.53 0.442 0.406 22.104 20.042 7.361 5.646 
 [0.029]** [0.072]* [0.129] [0.169] [0.003]*** [0.009]*** [0.311] [0.408] 
CEO  gov. official -0.181  -0.098  -2.526  -5.443  
 [0.544]  [0.732]  [0.822]  [0.516]  
Business Connection 0.296  -0.031  6.643  0.509  
 [0.062]*  [0.836]  [0.129]  [0.824]  
Managerial incentives         
CEO experience 0.03 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.749 1.038 0.481 0.479 
 [0.019]** [0.005]*** [0.034]** [0.035]** [0.018]** [0.001]*** [0.193] [0.166] 
CEO ownership 0.426 0.466 0.084 0.036 12.141 14.468 0.672 -2.044 
 [0.021]** [0.083]* [0.565] [0.827] [0.010]*** [0.073]* [0.872] [0.626] 
Annual salary system 0.12 0.112 0.338 0.336 0.697 0.475 11.355 11.199 
 [0.534]** [0.558]  [0.000]***  [0.003]*** [0.902] [0.926] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Board Structure         
Duality  -0.216  -0.215  -7.515  -4.766 
  [0.017]**  [0.005]***  [0.164]  [0.067]* 
Independent Director  -0.005  0.053  1.371  2.758 
  [0.815]  [0.158]  [0.059]*  [0.006]*** 
Board Ownership  0.093  0.251  4.389  6.922 
  [0.668]  [0.053]*  [0.474]  [0.000]*** 
Other controls         
Business Group  -0.481 -0.454 -0.01 -0.088 -6.724 -7.039 3.731 -20.588 
 [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.913] [0.204] [0.376] [0.337] [0.089]* [0.046]** 
Firm Age -0.077 -0.08 -0.076 -0.056 -0.789 -0.499 -3.342 -2.512 
 [0.355] [0.279] [0.092]* [0.329] [0.774] [0.859] [0.000]*** [0.009]*** 
Firm Size 0.366 0.37 0.175 0.184 10.314 10.965 4.412 4.361 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
GDP per Capita -0.471 -0.431 0.117 0.126 -29.935 -28.439 3.839 4.302 
 [0.034]** [0.077]* [0.341] [0.353] [0.007]*** [0.010]*** [0.430] [0.357] 
City Population -0.342 -0.335 0.103 0.915 -7.618 -8.001 2.282 2.127 
 [0.051]* [0.096]* [0.206] [0.250] [0.184] [0.222] [0.392] [0.356] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 693 686 1023 997 678 672 1004 978 
We split the sample firms into firms located in areas with a low degree of regional banking marketization index (marketization index<=5) and firms located in areas with a 
high degree of regional banking marketization index (marketization index>=5). Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in table 2. Two-tailed P-values are in 
brackets.*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
